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Discontinued source-available deejay encryption utility

TrueCrypt
TrueCrypt Logo.png
TrueCrypt on windows vista.png

TrueCrypt on Windows (discontinued)
Developer(due south) TrueCrypt Foundation
Initial release Feb 2004; xviii years ago  (2004-02) [1]
Terminal release

7.2 / May 28, 2014; vii years agone  (2014-05-28) [ii] (Discontinued)
Written in C, C++, Assembly[3]
Operating organisation Windows, macOS, Linux[3]
Size 3.thirty MB
Available in 38 languages[iv]

Listing of languages

English, Arabic, Basque, Belarusian, Bulgarian, Burmese, Catalan, Chinese (Simplified), Chinese (Hong Kong), Chinese (Taiwan), Czech, Danish, Dutch, Estonian, Finnish, French, Georgian, German, Greek, Hungarian, Indonesian, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Latvian, Norwegian (Nynorsk), Farsi, Smoothen, Portuguese (Brazil), Russian, Slovak, Slovenian, Spanish, Swedish, Turkish, Ukrainian, Uzbek (Cyrillic), Vietnamese
Type Disk encryption software
License TrueCrypt License iii.i (source-bachelor freeware)
Website truecrypt.sourceforge.net Edit this on Wikidata

TrueCrypt is a discontinued source-available freeware utility used for on-the-fly encryption (OTFE). It can create a virtual encrypted disk within a file, or encrypt a partition or the whole storage device (pre-kick authentication).

On 28 May 2014, the TrueCrypt website announced that the project was no longer maintained and recommended users find culling solutions. Though development of TrueCrypt has ceased, an independent audit of TrueCrypt (published in March 2015) has concluded that no significant flaws are present.[5] Two projects forked from TrueCrypt: VeraCrypt (agile) and CipherShed[6] (abandoned).

History [edit]

TrueCrypt was initially released equally version one.0 in February 2004, based on E4M (Encryption for the Masses). Several versions and many additional minor releases accept been made since then, with the near current version existence 7.1a.[1]

E4M and SecurStar dispute [edit]

Original release of TrueCrypt was made by bearding developers called "the TrueCrypt Team".[7] Shortly subsequently version 1.0 was released in 2004, the TrueCrypt Squad reported receiving email from Wilfried Hafner, director of SecurStar, a computer security visitor.[8] According to the TrueCrypt Team, Hafner claimed in the email that the acknowledged author of E4M, programmer Paul Le Roux, had stolen the source code from SecurStar every bit an employee.[8] Information technology was farther stated that Le Roux illegally distributed E4M, and authored an illegal license permitting anyone to base derivative work on the lawmaking and distribute information technology freely. Hafner alleges all versions of E4M e'er belonged merely to SecurStar, and Le Roux did not take whatever right to release it under such a license.[eight]

This led the TrueCrypt Team to immediately terminate developing and distributing TrueCrypt, which they announced online through usenet.[8] TrueCrypt Team member David Tesařík stated that Le Roux informed the team that at that place was a legal dispute betwixt himself and SecurStar, and that he received legal advisement non to annotate on whatever issues of the case. Tesařík concluded that should the TrueCrypt Squad continue distributing TrueCrypt, Le Roux may ultimately exist held liable and exist forced to pay consistent damages to SecurStar. To continue in proficient faith, he said, the team would need to verify the validity of the E4M license. However, because of Le Roux'southward need to remain silent on the matter, he was unable to confirm or deny its legitimacy, keeping TrueCrypt development in limbo.[viii] [9]

Thereafter, would-be visitors reported trouble accessing the TrueCrypt website, and tertiary-party mirrors appeared online making the source code and installer continually available, outside of official sanction by the TrueCrypt Squad.[10] [xi]

In the FAQ department of its website, SecurStar maintains its claims of ownership over both E4M and Scramdisk, another free encryption plan. The company states that with those products, SecurStar "had a long tradition of open source software", but that "competitors had nothing better to do merely to steal our source code", causing the company to make its products closed-source, forcing potential customers to place a substantial society and sign a non-disclosure agreement earlier existence allowed to review the code for security.[12]

Le Roux himself has denied developing TrueCrypt in a court hearing in March 2016, in which he likewise confirmed he had written E4M.[thirteen]

Version 2.0 [edit]

Months later on 7 June 2004, TrueCrypt 2.0 was released.[1] The new version independent a different digital signature from that of the original TrueCrypt Team, with the developers now being referred to equally "the TrueCrypt Foundation." The software license was likewise changed to the open up source GNU General Public License (GPL). However, given the wide range of components with differing licenses making up the software, and the contested nature of the legality of the program's release, a few weeks later on 21 June, version 2.1 was released under the original E4M license to avoid potential issues relating to the GPL license.[ane] [14]

Version 2.1a of the software was released on ane October 2004 on truecrypt.sourceforge.net sub-domain.[i] Past May 2005, the original TrueCrypt website returned and truecrypt.sourceforge.net redirected visitors to truecrypt.org.

End of life announcement [edit]

On 28 May 2014, the TrueCrypt official website, truecrypt.org, began redirecting visitors to truecrypt.sourceforge.net with a HTTP 301 "Moved Permanently" condition, which warned that the software may contain unfixed security issues, and that development of TrueCrypt was ended in May 2014, post-obit Windows XP's end of support. The bulletin noted that more recent versions of Windows have born support for deejay encryption using BitLocker, and that Linux and OS X had like born solutions, which the message states renders TrueCrypt unnecessary. The page recommends any data encrypted by TrueCrypt be migrated to other encryption setups and offered instructions on moving to BitLocker. The SourceForge project folio for the software at sourceforge.net/truecrypt was updated to display the aforementioned initial message, and the status was changed to "inactive."[xv] The page also appear a new software version, vii.2, which only allows decryption.

Initially, the authenticity of the proclamation and new software was questioned.[xvi] [17] [18] Multiple theories attempting to explain the reason behind the declaration arose throughout the tech community.[19] [3]

Presently after the cease of life annunciation of TrueCrypt, Gibson Inquiry Corporation posted an announcement titled "Yes... TrueCrypt is still safety to use" and a Last Release Repository to host the final official non-crippled version seven.1a of TrueCrypt.[3] They no longer practise as of 2022.

Truecrypt.org has been excluded from the Cyberspace Archive Wayback Machine.[20] Their exclusion policy says they exclude pages at site owner request.[21]

Operating systems [edit]

TrueCrypt supports Windows, OS X and Linux operating systems.[22] Both 32-bit and 64-fleck versions of these operating systems are supported, except for Windows IA-64 (not supported) and Mac Os X 10.half dozen Snow Leopard (runs as a 32-bit procedure).[22] The version for Windows 7, Windows Vista, and Windows XP tin encrypt the boot sectionalization or entire kick bulldoze.[23]

Independent implementations [edit]

There is an independent, compatible[24] [25] implementation, tcplay, for DragonFly BSD[24] and Linux.[25] [26]

The Dm-catacomb module included in default Linux kernel supports a TrueCrypt target called "tcw" since Linux version 3.xiii.[27] [28] [29]

Encryption scheme [edit]

Algorithms [edit]

Private ciphers supported by TrueCrypt are AES, Serpent, and Twofish. Additionally, v different combinations of cascaded algorithms are available: AES-Twofish, AES-Twofish-Serpent, Ophidian-AES, Serpent-Twofish-AES and Twofish-Serpent.[30] The cryptographic hash functions available for employ in TrueCrypt are RIPEMD-160, SHA-512, and Whirlpool.[31]

Modes of operation [edit]

TrueCrypt currently uses the XTS style of performance.[32] Prior to this, TrueCrypt used LRW mode in versions 4.1 through iv.3a, and CBC mode in versions iv.0 and earlier.[i] XTS mode is thought to exist more secure than LRW mode, which in plough is more than secure than CBC mode.[33]

Although new volumes can just exist created in XTS mode, TrueCrypt is backward uniform with older volumes using LRW mode and CBC mode.[1] Later versions produce a security alarm when mounting CBC mode volumes and recommend that they exist replaced with new volumes in XTS mode.

Keys [edit]

The header key and the secondary header key (XTS mode) are generated using PBKDF2 with a 512-scrap salt and thousand or 2000 iterations, depending on the underlying hash office used.[34]

Plausible deniability [edit]

TrueCrypt supports a concept chosen plausible deniability,[35] past assuasive a unmarried "hidden book" to be created within another volume.[36] In addition, the Windows versions of TrueCrypt accept the ability to create and run a hidden encrypted operating system whose existence may be denied.[37]

The TrueCrypt documentation lists many ways in which TrueCrypt'south subconscious volume deniability features may be compromised (e.g. by third-party software which may leak information through temporary files, thumbnails, etc., to unencrypted disks) and possible ways to avoid this.[38] In a newspaper published in 2008 and focused on the then latest version (v5.1a) and its plausible deniability, a team of security researchers led by Bruce Schneier states that Windows Vista, Microsoft Word, Google Desktop, and others store information on unencrypted disks, which might compromise TrueCrypt's plausible deniability. The report suggested the addition of a subconscious operating organization functionality; this characteristic was added in TrueCrypt 6.0. When a hidden operating system is running, TrueCrypt also makes local unencrypted filesystems and not-hidden TrueCrypt volumes read-only to foreclose data leaks.[37] The security of TrueCrypt's implementation of this feature was non evaluated because the first version of TrueCrypt with this option had only recently been released.[39]

At that place was a functional evaluation of the deniability of hidden volumes in an earlier version of TrueCrypt by Schneier et al. that found security leaks.[40]

Identifying TrueCrypt volumes [edit]

When analyzed, TrueCrypt volumes appear to have no header and contain random data.[41] TrueCrypt volumes accept sizes that are multiples of 512 due to the block size of the cipher manner[32] and key data is either 512 bytes stored separately in the example of system encryption or two 128 kB headers for non-system containers.[42] Forensics tools may use these properties of file size, apparent lack of a header, and randomness tests to endeavor to identify TrueCrypt volumes.[43] Although these features give reason to suspect a file to exist a TrueCrypt volume, there are, however, some programs which exist for the purpose of securely erasing files by employing a method of overwriting file contents, and free deejay space, with purely random data (i.eastward. "shred" & "scrub"[44]), thereby creating reasonable doubt to counter pointed accusations declaring a file, made of statistically random data, to exist a TrueCrypt file.[35] [45]

If a system bulldoze, or a partition on it, has been encrypted with TrueCrypt, so only the information on that partition is deniable. When the TrueCrypt boot loader replaces the normal boot loader, an offline analysis of the drive tin can positively determine that a TrueCrypt boot loader is present and so atomic number 82 to the logical inference that a TrueCrypt partition is also present. Even though at that place are features to obfuscate its purpose (i.due east. displaying a BIOS-like message to misdirect an observer such as, "Not-system deejay" or "disk error"), these reduce the functionality of the TrueCrypt boot loader and do not hide the content of the TrueCrypt kick loader from offline analysis.[46] Here again, the apply of a hidden operating organization is the suggested method for retaining deniability.[37]

Functioning [edit]

TrueCrypt supports parallelized[47] : 63 encryption for multi-core systems and, under Microsoft Windows, pipelined read/write operations (a form of asynchronous processing)[47] : 63 to reduce the performance hit of encryption and decryption. On newer processors supporting the AES-NI educational activity fix, TrueCrypt supports hardware-accelerated AES to further improve performance.[47] : 64 The performance impact of disk encryption is especially noticeable on operations which would unremarkably utilize directly retentiveness access (DMA), every bit all information must pass through the CPU for decryption, rather than being copied directly from deejay to RAM.

In a test carried out past Tom's Hardware, although TrueCrypt is slower compared to an unencrypted deejay, the overhead of existent-time encryption was establish to be similar regardless of whether mid-range or land-of-the-fine art hardware is in utilize, and this bear upon was "quite adequate".[48] In another article the performance price was found to be unnoticeable when working with "popular desktop applications in a reasonable style", only information technology was noted that "power users volition complain".[49]

Incompatibility with FlexNet Publisher and SafeCast [edit]

Installing third-party software which uses FlexNet Publisher or SafeCast (which are used for preventing software piracy on products by Adobe such as Adobe Photoshop) can damage the TrueCrypt bootloader on Windows partitions/drives encrypted past TrueCrypt and render the drive unbootable.[50] This is caused by the inappropriate blueprint of FlexNet Publisher writing to the starting time bulldoze rail and overwriting whatsoever non-Windows bootloader exists there.[51]

Security concerns [edit]

TrueCrypt is vulnerable to diverse known attacks which are also present in other disk encryption software releases such as BitLocker. To prevent those, the documentation distributed with TrueCrypt requires users to follow diverse security precautions.[52] Some of those attacks are detailed below.

Encryption keys stored in memory [edit]

TrueCrypt stores its keys in RAM; on an ordinary personal computer the DRAM will maintain its contents for several seconds after power is cut (or longer if the temperature is lowered). Even if in that location is some degradation in the retention contents, various algorithms can intelligently recover the keys. This method, known as a common cold boot assault (which would apply in detail to a notebook computer obtained while in power-on, suspended, or screen-locked mode), has been successfully used to attack a file system protected by TrueCrypt.[53]

Physical security [edit]

TrueCrypt documentation states that TrueCrypt is unable to secure data on a figurer if an assailant physically accessed information technology and TrueCrypt is used on the compromised computer by the user once more (this does not use to a common case of a stolen, lost, or confiscated computer).[54] The attacker having physical admission to a calculator can, for example, install a hardware/software keylogger, a jitney-mastering device capturing retention, or install any other malicious hardware or software, allowing the assailant to capture unencrypted information (including encryption keys and passwords), or to decrypt encrypted information using captured passwords or encryption keys. Therefore, physical security is a bones premise of a secure system. Attacks such as this are frequently chosen "evil maid attacks".[55]

Malware [edit]

TrueCrypt documentation states that TrueCrypt cannot secure data on a computer if it has any kind of malware installed. Malware may log keystrokes, thus exposing passwords to an attacker.[56]

The "Stoned" bootkit [edit]

The "Stoned" bootkit, an MBR rootkit presented past Austrian software developer Peter Kleissner at the Black Lid Technical Security Conference USA 2009,[57] [58] has been shown capable of tampering TrueCrypt's MBR, effectively bypassing TrueCrypt's total volume encryption.[59] [sixty] [61] [62] [63] Potentially every hard disk drive encryption software is affected by this kind of attack if the encryption software does not rely on hardware-based encryption technologies like TPM, or if the attack is made with authoritative privileges while the encrypted operating system is running.[64] [65]

2 types of set on scenarios exist in which information technology is possible to maliciously take advantage of this bootkit: in the first i, the user is required to launch the bootkit with administrative privileges once the PC has already booted into Windows; in the second one, analogously to hardware keyloggers, a malicious person needs concrete access to the user's TrueCrypt-encrypted hard disk: in this context this is needed to alter the user's TrueCrypt MBR with that of the Stoned bootkit and so place the difficult disk back on the unknowing user'south PC, so that when the user boots the PC and types his/her TrueCrypt password on boot, the "Stoned" bootkit intercepts information technology thereafter because, from that moment on, the Stoned bootkit is loaded before TrueCrypt'due south MBR in the kick sequence. The first blazon of attack can be prevented as usual by skilful security practices, due east.g. avert running not-trusted executables with authoritative privileges. The 2nd one tin can be successfully neutralized by the user if he/she suspects that the encrypted hd might have been physically available to someone he/she does not trust, past booting the encrypted operating system with TrueCrypt's Rescue Disk instead of booting information technology directly from the hard disk. With the rescue deejay, the user can restore TrueCrypt's MBR to the hard deejay.[66]

Trusted Platform Module [edit]

The FAQ section of the TrueCrypt website states that the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) cannot be relied upon for security, because if the assailant has physical or administrative access to the figurer and you apply it subsequently, the computer could have been modified by the attacker due east.g. a malicious component—such as a hardware keystroke logger—could take been used to capture the password or other sensitive information. Since the TPM does not prevent an attacker from maliciously modifying the computer, TrueCrypt volition not support the TPM.[65]

Security audits [edit]

In 2013 a graduate student at Concordia University published a detailed online report, in which he states that he has confirmed the integrity of the distributed Windows binaries of version 7.1a.[67]

A crowdfunding entrada attempting to conduct an contained security audit of TrueCrypt was successfully funded in Oct 2013. A not-profit organization called the Open Crypto Audit Project (OCAP) was formed, calling itself "a customs-driven global initiative which grew out of the showtime comprehensive public audit and cryptanalysis of the widely used encryption software TrueCrypt".[68] The organization established contact with TrueCrypt developers, who welcomed the audit.[69] [70] Phase I of the audit was successfully completed on xiv Apr 2014, finding "no evidence of backdoors or malicious code". Matthew D. Green, ane of the auditors, added "I retrieve it's good that we didn't find annihilation super critical."[71]

One mean solar day after TrueCrypt's end of life announcement, OCAP confirmed that the inspect would continue as planned, with Phase II expected to begin in June 2014 and wrap upwardly by the end of September.[72] [73] The Phase 2 audit was delayed, but was completed 2 April 2015 past NCC Cryptography Services. This inspect "found no bear witness of deliberate backdoors, or any severe blueprint flaws that volition make the software insecure in most instances."[74] [75] [76] The French National Bureau for the Security of Information Systems (ANSSI) stated that while TrueCrypt half dozen.0 and 7.1a have previously attained ANSSI certification, migration to an alternating certified product is recommended every bit a precautionary measure out.[77]

According to Gibson Research Corporation, Steven Barnhart wrote to an e-mail accost for a TrueCrypt Foundation member he had used in the past and received several replies from "David". According to Barnhart, the chief points of the email letters were that the TrueCrypt Foundation was "happy with the audit, it didn't spark anything", and that the reason for the annunciation was that "in that location is no longer interest [in maintaining the project]."[78]

Co-ordinate to a report released 29 September 2015, TrueCrypt includes two vulnerabilities in the driver that TrueCrypt installs on Windows systems allowing an aggressor arbitrary code execution and privilege escalation via DLL hijacking.[79] In Jan 2016, the vulnerability was fixed in VeraCrypt,[eighty] but it remains unpatched in TrueCrypt's unmaintained installers.

Legal cases [edit]

Performance Satyagraha [edit]

In July 2008, several TrueCrypt-secured hard drives were seized from Brazilian banker Daniel Dantas, who was suspected of financial crimes. The Brazilian National Institute of Criminology (INC) tried unsuccessfully for five months to obtain access to his files on the TrueCrypt-protected disks. They enlisted the aid of the FBI, who used dictionary attacks against Dantas' disks for over 12 months, only were still unable to decrypt them.[81] [82]

United states of america 5. John Doe [edit]

In 2012 the United States 11th Excursion Court of Appeals ruled that a John Doe TrueCrypt user could not exist compelled to decrypt several of his hard drives.[83] [84] The court'due south ruling noted that FBI forensic examiners were unable to become by TrueCrypt's encryption (and therefore were unable to access the data) unless Doe either decrypted the drives or gave the FBI the password, and the court then ruled that Doe'due south Fifth Amendment right to remain silent legally prevented the Government from making him or her do and then.[85] [86]

David Miranda [edit]

On xviii August 2013 David Miranda, partner of journalist Glenn Greenwald, was detained at London'due south Heathrow Airport by Metropolitan Police while en road to Rio de Janeiro from Berlin. He was carrying with him an external hard bulldoze said to exist containing sensitive documents pertaining to the 2013 global surveillance disclosures sparked by Edward Snowden. Contents of the drive were encrypted by TrueCrypt, which authorities said "renders the cloth extremely difficult to access."[87] Detective Superintendent Caroline Goode stated the hard drive independent around 60 gigabytes of data, "of which simply twenty accept been accessed to engagement." She further stated the process to decode the fabric was circuitous and "so far merely 75 documents have been reconstructed since the holding was initially received."[87]

Guardian contributor Naomi Colvin ended the statements were misleading, stating that it was possible Goode was not even referring to whatsoever actual encrypted material, but rather deleted files reconstructed from unencrypted, unallocated infinite on the hard drive, or even plaintext documents from Miranda'south personal effects.[88] Glenn Greenwald supported this assessment in an interview with Democracy Now!, mentioning that the UK regime filed an affirmation asking the court to allow them to retain possession of Miranda'south belongings. The grounds for the request were that they could not break the encryption, and were simply able to admission 75 of the documents that he was carrying, which Greenwald said "most of which were probably ones related to his schoolhouse work and personal use."[89]

James DeSilva [edit]

In February 2014, an Arizona Section of Existent Estate IT department employee, James DeSilva, was arrested on charges of sexual exploitation of a modest through the sharing of explicit images over the Internet. His estimator, encrypted with TrueCrypt, was seized, and DeSilva refused to reveal the countersign. Forensics detectives from the Maricopa County Sheriff'southward Office were unable to gain access to his stored files.[90]

Lauri Dearest [edit]

In October 2013, British–Finnish activist Lauri Dear was arrested by the National Criminal offense Agency (NCA) on charges of hacking into a US department or bureau estimator and ane count of conspiring to do the same.[91] [92] [93] The regime confiscated all of his electronics and demanded he provide them with the necessary keys to decrypt the devices. Love refused. On 10 May 2016 a District Estimate (Magistrate'southward Courtroom) rejected a request by the NCA that Love exist forced to plow over his encryption keys or passwords to TrueCrypt files on an SD card and hard drives that were among the confiscated property.[94]

Druking [edit]

In the special prosecutor investigation for Druking in South Korea, the special prosecutor decrypted some of the files encrypted by TrueCrypt by guessing the passphrase.[95] [96]

The special prosecutor said the hidden volumes were especially difficult to deal with. He decrypted some of encrypted files by trying words and phrases the druking grouping had used elsewhere as parts of the passphrase in society to make educated guesses.[97] [98] [99] [100]

License and source model [edit]

TrueCrypt was released equally source-available, under the "TrueCrypt License," which is unique to the TrueCrypt software.[101] [102] Equally of version seven.1a (the last full version of the software, released Feb 2012), the TrueCrypt License was version 3.0. Information technology is non part of the panoply of widely used open source licenses. The Free Software Foundation (FSF) states that it is non a free software license.[103]

Discussion of the licensing terms on the Open Source Initiative (OSI)'s license-talk over mailing list in October 2013 suggests that the TrueCrypt License has made progress towards compliance with the Open Source Definition but would not yet pass if proposed for certification as Open Source software.[104] [105] Co-ordinate to current OSI president Simon Phipps:

...it is not at all appropriate for [TrueCrypt] to draw itself as "open source." This use of the term "open source" to describe something nether a license that's non only unapproved by OSI but known to be subject to issues is unacceptable. ... Equally OSI managing director and open up source expert Karl Fogel said, "The platonic solution is not to take them remove the words 'open source' from their cocky-description, but rather for their software to be nether an OSI-approved open source license."[104]

Equally a result of its questionable status with regard to copyright restrictions and other potential legal bug,[106] major Linux distributions do non consider the TrueCrypt License free: TrueCrypt is not included with Debian,[107] Ubuntu,[108] Fedora,[109] or openSUSE.[110]

Cease of life and license version 3.1 [edit]

28 May 2014 declaration of discontinuation of TrueCrypt besides came with a new version 7.ii of the software. Amid the many changes to the source lawmaking from the previous release were changes to the TrueCrypt License — including removal of specific language that required attribution of TrueCrypt as well as a link to the official website to exist included on whatever derivative products — forming a license version 3.i.[111]

Cryptographer Matthew Dark-green, who had help raise funds for TrueCrypt's audit noted a connection between TrueCrypt's refusal to change the license and their departure-time warning. "They set the whole thing on fire, and now possibly nobody is going to trust information technology considering they'll recollect there'southward some big evil vulnerability in the code."[112]

On 16 June 2014, the only declared TrueCrypt developer nevertheless answering email replied to a message by Matthew Green asking for permission to utilise the TrueCrypt trademark for a fork released under a standard open source license. Permission was denied, which led to the two known forks beingness named VeraCrypt and CipherShed likewise every bit a re-implementation named tc-play rather than TrueCrypt.[113] [114]

Trademarks [edit]

In 2007 a US trademark for TrueCrypt was registered under the name of Ondrej Tesarik with a company name TrueCrypt Developers Clan [115] and a trademark on the "key" logo was registered nether the name of David Tesarik with a company name TrueCrypt Developers Association.[116]

In 2009 the company name TrueCrypt Foundation was registered in the US by a person named David Tesarik.[117] The TrueCrypt Foundation non-profit system last filed tax returns in 2010,[118] and the company was dissolved in 2014.[ commendation needed ]

See also [edit]

  • Comparing of deejay encryption software

References [edit]

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External links [edit]

  • Official website Edit this at Wikidata
  • Open up Crypto Audit Project (OCAP) – non-turn a profit organization promoting an audit of TrueCrypt
  • IsTrueCryptAuditedYet.com – website for the audit
  • Veracrypt – official fork website

Archives [edit]

  • Past versions on FileHippo
  • Past versions on GitHub
  • By versions on truecrypt.ch
  • Concluding version on Gibson Research Corporation website
  • Partial mirror of the original TrueCrypt 7.1a online manual

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